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In re Braxton
258 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 2001)
LFas
Tessa Van Hart ("Van Hart") was sodomized, shot and killed on January27,
1994. Van Hart worked as a pizza delivery person and was lured to the "Small
Piney Island" area of Chincoteague Island to deliver a pizza Van Hart's body
was found one mile from the delivery location in the back seat of her car. The
cause of Van Hart's death was two gunshot wounds to the head. For more than
two years, the perpetrator of Van Hart's murder was a mystery. Polymerase
chain reaction testing ("PCR"), a form of DNA testing, was conducted on the
seminal fluids found in Van Hart's anus and the results were inconclusive.2
OnJune 3,1996, Brian Lee Cherrix ("Cherrix") offered to disclose information about the Van Hart murder to the police in the hopes of leniency in a
pending criminal proceeding. Cherrix first told police that his cousin, who had
died the year previous, had committed the murder and told Cherrix of the details.
From (ierrix's information, the police recovered the .22 caliber Marlin rifle used
inthe murder. Cherrix told the police several variations of his story. On April
25, 1997, Cherrix confessed orallyto the murder of Van Hart but refused to sign
the written version, and has sincd disavowed the confession. Cherrix presented
an alibi defense at trial to support his plea of not guily Cherrix was convicted
of capital murder, forcible sodomyand several other related charges. Cherrix was
sentenced to death for the murder of Van Hart."
Cherrix appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Virginia on the
following issues: (1)his confession should have been suppressed; (2) the verdict
was contraryto law and evidence; (3)the juryinstructions were incorrect; (4) the

denial of a mental health expert; and (5) the Commonwealth failed to prove
future dangerousness or vileness.' The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected all of
Cherrix's claims and affirmed the conviction and death sentence.6 The United
States Supreme Court denied Cherrix's petition for a writ of certiorari' The
1. Cherrix v. Commonweath, 513 SE2d 642, 645-46 (Va. 1999) (affimning Cherrix's
conviction and sentence).

2. In reBrmon, 258 F.3d 250,253-54 (4th Gr. 2001).
3. Id at 252-53.
4.
5.

Gf'rix, 513 S.E2d at 646-47.
Idat 647-56.

6.

Id at 656.

7.

Cherrix v. Vuginia, 528 US. 873 (1999).
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Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed (lerrix's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus and denied a reheating on that issue
Before his execution, Cherrix filed a motion to stay his execution in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to allow him
time to file his federal habeas corpus claim. The district court granted Clerrix's
motion for appointment of counsel and stayed his execution on August 15,2000.
Qierrix then made a motion to retest the DNA evidence and also made a separate motion, at a later date, for preservation of the evidence. The district court
conditionally granted the latter motion on December 12, 2000. On December
28, 2000, Cherrix filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On January 9,
2001, the district court ordered the preservation of the evidence and funding for
the retesting. The warden made an oral motion to stay the order, which was
denied. The Commonwealth then filed an appeal of the order, an application for
an emergency stay of the order, and a petition for a writ of mandamus and/or
prohibition in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.'
II. Hddg
The Fourth Crcuit granted the emergency stay. After inviting the district
court to submit a response to the petition, the Fourth (tuit dismissed the
appeal and denied the petition. 1 The Fourth Circuit premised its dismissal of the
appeal on the interlocutory nature of the appeal, the absence of any irreparable
consequences, and the non-immediacy of any threat of harm to the Commonwealth." The Fourth Circuit denied the Commonwealth's mandamus petition
because other adequate means of relief from the district court's order existed.12
XI. A nJ~ss /Appica nmVugma
The Fourth Circuit reiterated the district court's rationale for the order as
the following: (1) under 21 U.S.C S 848(q), the district court may "provide
funding for services which are reasonably necessary to support a petition for
habeas corpus"; (2) the "DNA retesting is reasonably necessary to support
Clierrix's claims of actual innocence,... other constitutional claims,.. . as well
as a potential clemencypetition"; and (3) "Cherrix showed good cause for DNA
retesting, entitling himto discoverypursuant to Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing
52254 Cases and 28 U.S.C S 2254(2)(A)(ii), (2)(B)."'
8.
2000).
9.
10.
11.
12.

Bn=rm, 258 F3d at 254. SwgevvA!y Chefrix v. Braxton, 131 F. Supp. 2d 756 (ED. Va.

Bmx rem, 258 F.3d at 254-55.
Id at 261.
Id at 257-60.
Id at 261.
13.
Id at 255; seeaso 21 U.S.C S 848(q)(4)(A) (1994) (allowing the court to appoint counsel,
investigators or experts inany case punishable by death, where the defendant is financially unable
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In holding that the order was not a final order, nor directed at the merits,
and thus, not appealable, the Fourth Circuit stated "[clearly, the January9, 2001
Order is just a step in the litigation process that is not directed to the merits of
the underlying habeas action."" While this language maybe construed to dismiss
the importance of DNA evidence, it allows district courts great discretion in
granting such orders. Similarly, the language may allow the practitioner great
leeway in requesting such orders, especiallyin older cases. The district court, in
finding good cause, acknowledged that DNA technology has vastly improved
since the 1994 testing of the spermatozoa, and that two new tests are now used
that analyze epithelial and white blood cells instead of spermatozoa. 5 Therefore
the practitioner must assess whether any new DNA testing methods have been
developed since his client's evidence was tested. If new tests exist, the practitioner has a strong and valid argument for DNA retesting. 6

The Fourth Circuit also distinguished this case from MC0zky v Zar y
which cautioned against federal habeas review." The court asserted that a federal
court has a "duty to examine actions taken bythe Commonwealth to make sure
that the final result obtained is one in keeping with Cherrix's constitutional
rights." 9 The court's language implies that DNA testing may be necessary to
prevent violation of a defendant's constitutional rights. The court balanced this
concern with any "irreparable harm" flowing to the Commonwealth: "[I]t is
doubtful that harm would flow to anyone other than Cherx "20 'The astute
practitioner should utilize the arguments made bythe Fourth Circuit in declining
the Commonwealth's petition and the Warden's appeal to fend off any attacks
bythe Commonwealth when attempting to obtain DNA retesting.
The Fourth Circuit dismissed the Commonwealth's petition for a writ of
mandamus with little commentary other than the statement that "other adequate
means exist to attain the relief [the Commonwealth] desires." 2 1 The court
premised this statement on the rationale discussed above, and added that the

to obtain these services); 28 US.C 2254(e)(2)(A)(is- (B)(Supp. V 1999) (allowing the court to hold

anevidentianyhearing onlyif petitioner has shown facts previouslyuninowable and the facts would
have precluded a finding of guilt); 28 US.C foll. S 2254 RULES GOVERN G 52254 CASES R.6
(1994) (setting out procedure required for discovery under S 2254).
14. Bnrxwpt, 258 F.3d at 257.
15. Id at 254.
16. The practitioner should also note that "(t]his [was] the fist time in anyproceeding that
Cherrix ha[d] requested DNA retesting." Bnrxm 258 F.3d at 254. Therefore, the practitioner may
raise this argument for the first time in the federal habeas proceeding.
17. 499 US. 467 (1991).
18. Bnna, 258 F3d at 259; seeaboMclesky v. Zant, 499 US. 467 (1991).
19. Bnetam, 258 F3d at 259 (citing Cherrix v. Braxton, 131 F. Supp. 2d 756,784 (ED. Va.
2000)).
20. Id at 258.
21. Id at 261.
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Commonwealth may appeal after a final order is entered by the district court.'
This section of the opinion has little effect for the Virginia practitioner.
IV. Cm7iszn

In this case, the Fourth Circuit did not disturb the district court's order.
Several important tools maybe drawn from the Fourth Gcuit's holding. First,
good cause for further discovery under Rule 6(a) may be shown by improved
technologyover a period as short as six years. Second, the court associates DNA
testing with fairness and constitutional rights. Third, the Commonwealth does
not have a strong argument against these two propositions; the Commonwealth
will not be irreparably harmed by DNA retesting.
Kathryn Roe Eldridge

22.

Id

